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JURISDICTIONAL STATEMENT AND CASE HISTORY
The Supreme Court has jurisdiction over this appeal
pursuant to Utah Code Ann. § 78-2-2(3)(i) and Rule 3(a), Rules of
the Supreme Court.

Plaintiffs Raymond and Debra Cannefax are

appealing from a summary judgment entered in favor of defendants
Donald and Ruth Clement on March 4, 1988.

(R. 184-186)

The

Order and Summary Judgment entered by the trial court resulted in
judgment in the Clement's favor on plaintiffs' Complaint (R. 2-9)
and on their Counterclaim (R. 32-36).
The Cannefax 1 s brought this action seeking to quiet
their title to property on Lockhart Road in Salt Lake County and
to restrain the Salt Lake County Sheriff from executing upon the
property to satisfy a judgment in favor of the Clements and
against George W. Barker, Jr. and Lila M. Barker.

The Clements

counterclaimed seeking a declaration by the trial court that
their judgment against the Barkers created a lien against the
Lockhart Road property.
The parties stipulated in writing to the facts and
defendants moved for summary judgment.
granted on February 29, 1988.
entered on March 4, 1988.

The motion was heard and

An Order and Summary Judgment was

(R. 184-186)

Plaintiffs Cannefax

appealed from that Order and Summary Judgment in a timely manner.

1

STATEMENT OF THE ISSUE PRESENTED ON APPEAL
Defendants-Respondents Donald and Ruth Clement believe
the sole issue on appeal should be stated as follows:
Does a judgment lien attach to property owned by a
judgment debtor/ but sold by the judgment debtor under a contract
of sale prior to docketing of the judgment/ when there is still a
balance owing to the judgment debtor under the contract of sale?
Stated otherwise/ the issue is whether a contract
vendor of real property retains an interest in the real property
to which the lien of a judgment against him can attach/ when the
l

contract is still executory.
DETERMINITIVE STATUTE
Utah Code Ann, § 78-22-1 "From the time the judgment of the district court or

I

circuit court is docketed and filed in the office of the clerk of
the district court of the county it becomes a lien upon all the
(

real property of the judgment debtor/ not exempt from execution/
in the county in which the judgment is entered/ owned by him at
the time or by him thereafter acquired during the existence of
1
said lien . . .."

1. A photocopy of the entire statute is included in the
Addendum to this Respondents1 Brief.

2

1

i

<

STATEMENT OF THE CASE
A- STATEMENT OF FACTS
The relevant facts are undisputed and the parties filed
2
a pleading entitled Stipulated Facts with the trial courtOn August 28/ 1981/ George and Lila Barker were fee
simple owners of residential property on Lockhart Road in Salt
Lake County, Utah

("the Lockhart Road property") (R. 105)-

On

that date/ the Barkers entered into a Uniform Real Estate
Contract with Diane Hodge for sale of the Lockhart Road property
for the sum of $160/000/ payable $40/000 down and balance over a
period of time with interest (R„- 106) *
At the time of the contract sale of the property from
the Barkers to Diane Hodge/ there existed prior mortgage loan
obligations against the property in favor of Prudential Federal
Savings & Loan Association ("Prudential") and Continental Bank
and Trust Company ("Continental") (R. 106)On August 31/ 1981/ Ms- Hodge caused a Notice of
Contract to be recorded with the Salt Lake County Recorder (R.
106) .
Four years later.' on August 15. 1985/ respondents
Donald and Ruth Clement obtained a judgment in the Seventh
Judicial District Court of Uintah County against the Barkers in
2. The original pleading entitled Stipulated Facts does not
appear to be in the court file. However/ a copy signed by
counsel for appellants is at R. 105-108. The same copy is found
in the Addendum to the Brief of Plaintiff-Appellants/ and a copy
signed by counsel for each side is included in the Addendum to
this brief.

3

the amount of $70,526.00 (R. 106).

The judgment was docketed

with the clerk of the Third Judicial District Court of Salt Lake
County on August 19, 1985 (R. 106).

j

The Clement f s judgment

against the Barkers was not appealed (R. 106).
On September 25, 1985, the Barkers still held legal

'

title to the Lockhart Road property, subject to Diane Hodge's
interest under the Uniform Real Estate Contract (R. 106-107).

As

of September 25, 1985, Ms. Hodge owed the Barkers $87,747.40
under the Uniform Real Estate Contract, and the prior obligations
to Prudential and Continental totaled $33,282.50 (R. 107).
At a real estate closing on September 25, 1985, Diane
Hodge paid the Barkers $45,000, and the Barkers gave Ms. Hodge a
credit of $9,464.94 (R. 107).

The mortgage loan balances in
I

favor of Prudential and Continental were paid off, and the
Barkers gave Ms. Hodge a warranty deed to the Lockhart Road
property (R. 107-108).
At the same closing, Diane Hodge gave a warranty deed
to the property to appellants Raymond and Debra Cannefax (R.
107) .
i

Both warranty deeds—first the one from the Barkers to
Hodge, and then the one from Hodge to the Cannefax's—were
recorded on September 26, 1985 (R. 107).

Between closing on

September 25, 1985, and recording on September 26, 1985, Surety
Title Agency conducted a title search which disclosed the
Clement's judgment against the Barkers (R. 108).
i

4
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B. THE TRIAL COURT PROCEEDINGS
When the Clements learned that the Barkers had owned
property in Salt Lake County at the time their judgment against
the Barkers was docketed in Salt Lake County/ they obtained a
Writ of Execution and caused the Salt Lake County Sheriff to
serve it.

In response, the Cannefax's brought the instant action

against the Clements to quiet title to the Lockhart Road property
against the judgment lien claimed by the Clements and to restrain
the Sheriff from executing upon the judgment lien-

The Clements

counterclaimed for a declaratory judgment that their judgment
lien attached to the property and. was superior to the Cannefaxs1
interest in the property.
The parties stipulated to the facts set forth above and
the Clements moved for summary judgment.
motion was argued and granted.

The summary judgment

The Honorable Pat B. Brian ruled

that when the judgment was docketed in Salt Lake County, it
created a lien on the Lockhart Road property to the extent of the
amount unpaid on the Uniform Real Estate Contract betwen the
Barkers and Diane Hodge as of September 25, 1985 (the date Hodge
received a warranty deed from the Barkers and gave a warranty
deed to the Cannefaxes), less the amount of the prior
encumbrances in favor of Prudential and Continental:

to wit, the

judgment lien bound the Lockhart road property in the sum of
$54,464.94 (R. 184-186).

The Cannefaxes appealed from the

summary judgment granted the Clements.

5

SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT
The general rule, which should be recognized in Utah/

]

is that the interest of a vendor in lands contracted to be sold
is bound by the lien of a judgment against him while the contract
is unexecuted/ to the extent it is unexecuted.

In order to adopt

'

the general rule/ this court need only recognize that "the real
property of the judgment debtor"/ as referred to in Utah's
judgment lien statute/ U.C.A. § 78-22-1/ includes the interest in
real property retained by a contract vendor.
Appellants1 reliance on the doctrine of equitable
conversion is misplaced because that doctrine is only applied by
courts when it is equitable that it be applied.

In this case/

there are no such equities that would require the court to resort
to a fiction and find that the legal titleholder of real property
does not own the property.

Appellants1 agent had notice of the

judgment against the Barkers prior to recording the deed from the
i

Barkers to Hodge and the deed from Hodge to appellants/ but chose
to proceed to record those deeds and bind title insurance on the
property.

Thus/ the equities of the transaction favor the
i

Clements.
On the other hand/ to mechanically apply the doctrine
of equitable conversion to cases where a judgment debtor has sold
his real property on contract may provide a fool-proof method for
many judgment debtors to dictate the terms by which his or her
creditor must accept payment on the judgment.

6

i

ARGUMENT
A.
THE INTEREST OF A VENDOR OF LANDS CONTRACTED TO BE SOLD
IS BOUND BY THE LIEN OF A JUDGMENT RECOVERED AGAINST
HIM WHILE THE CONTRACT IS UNEXECUTED, TO THE
EXTENT TO WHICH IT IS UNEXECUTED
As stated above, the issue in this case is whether the
Clement's judgment lien attached to the interest of their
judgment debtors in the Lockhart Road property, even though the
judgment debtors had contracted to sell the property prior to
docketing of the judgment.

The Clements submit that their

judgment lien did attach to the Lockhart Road property to the
extent that Diane Hodge, the contract vendee, still owed the
judgment debtors on the Uniform Real Estate Contract, i.e.,
$54,464.90 ($87,747.40 less the $33,282.50 owed by the Barkers to
Prudential and Continental).
As stated in 46 Am Jur 2d Judgments § 266, "The general
rule is that the interest of a vendor in lands contracted to be
sold is bound by the lien of a judgment recovered against him
while the contract is unexecuted, to the extent it is
unexecuted."

The Utah Supreme Court has not directly addressed

the question, but dicta in a recent case exhibits recognition of
the validity of a lien on the remaining interest in property
owned by a contract vendor.

In Butler v. Wilkinson, 740 P.2d

1244 (Utah 1987), the court specifically held that the term "real
property" in Utah's judgment lien statute includes the equitable
interest of a vendee under an installment land sale contract, and
a judgment against a vendee docketed in the county where the land

7

is located imposes a lien on the vendee's interest.

The court's

opinion goes on to state as follows:
11

• . . A vendee who voluntarily assigns or sells his
equitable interest to a third person or who rescinds the
contract under which his equitable interest arises does not
by the assignment/ sale/ or rescission extinguish creditors1
judgment liens that attached during the vendee's ownership
of the equitable interest. [Citations]. Nor/ for that
matter/ is a judgment lien against the vendor's interest
extinguished by the vendor's sale of that interest to a
third person. Utah Farm Production Credit Association v.,
Wasatch Bank/ [734 P.2d 904], 53 Utah Adv. Rep. 11 (March
19/ 1987); First Security Bank v. Rogers, 91 Idaho 654, 657,
429 P.2d 386 (1967)." (740 P.2d at 1257-1258) (emphasis
added)
Appellants argue that once the Barkers entered into the
Uniform Real Estate Contract with Diane Hodge, the Barkers were
left with only a personal property security interest in the
Lockhart Road property.

As between the Barkers and Hodge that

may be an accurate assessment.

When the interest of third

persons are considered, such as the Clements in this case, the
analysis differs.

The quoted language from Butler v. Wilkinson

clearly shows that in such a case the contract vendor does retain
an interest in the real property. "By definition, a judgment lien
only attaches to an interest in real property.

U.C.A. § 78-22-1.

Therefore, when the Butler opinion refers to "a judgment lien
against the vendor's interest", it necessarily refers to an
interest in real property.
First Security Bank v. Rogers, supra, cited with
approval in Butler v. Wilkinson, is instructive.

In that case,

Rogers sold certain real property in Nez Perce County on contract
to the Eatons in December 1959.

In January 1962, Nez Perce

Roller Mills obtained a judgment against the Rogers and filed an

8

abstract of the judgment in the Nez Perce County recorder's
office.

Subsequently/ other persons obtained judgments against

Rogers.

In April 1965/ the Eatons deposited a lump sum final

payment under the contract of sale into an escrow account with
First Security Bank.

First Security deposited $4,061.86 into

court and filed an interpleader action/ interpleading all of
Rogers1 judgment creditors.

Nez Perce Roller Mills moved the

court for summary judgment on the ground that its judgment was
the first to be docketed in Nez Perce County and the amount of
the judgment was in excess of the amount deposited with the
court.

The trial court granted the motion and the Idaho Supreme

Court affirmed/ stating:
"Appellants contend that the doctrine of equitable
conversion must apply/ so that after execution of the
contract with the Eatons, Rogers1 interest in the property
was transformed from an interest in realty to an interest in
personalty to which the judgment lien could not attach.
The doctrine of equitable conversion is a fiction
resting upon the fundamental rule of equity that equity
regards that as done which ought to be done. Under the
doctrine/ an equitable conversion takes place when a
contract of sale of real property becomes binding on the
parties. . . .
. . . the doctrine is not one of universal application.
Dean Pound has stated [quoting from Pound/ The Progress of
the Law 1918-1919/ 33 Harv.L.Rev. 813, 831 (1920)]:
"When we speak of conversion we are not describing a
condition of the property for all purposes with respect
to everybody but are giving a name to a situation
resulting from the application of equitable doctrines
to a state of facts between certain parties."
The doctrine of equitable conversion generally does not
apply to the facts of the instant case« The majority rule
is that a judgment lien against a vendor after.the making of
the contract of sale/ but prior to making and delivery of
the deed/ extends to all of the vendor's interest remaining

9

in the land and binds the land to the extent of the unpaid
purchase price. [Citations]." (429 P.2d at 389)
Numerous other courts have held likewise.

See, for

example/ May v. Emerson/ 96 P. 454 (Or. 1908), which held as
follows:
I
"It is beyond controversy that the title remains in the
vendor until the actual delivery of the deed. The vendor
still has not only the legal title, but also an interest in
the property as security for the payment of the purchase
price; and this interest should be and is available to a
creditor through the lien of his judgment . . . . If the
purchase price is fully paid/ although the deed is not
actually delivered/ the vendor having but the naked legal
title/ the judgment creditor can acquire no more. [Citations.] But to the extent of the unpaid purchase price the
creditors lien will bind the property . . .."
(96 P. at
455)

,

See also, Heath v. Dodson, 110 P.2d 845 (Wash. 1941).
In that case Dodson obtained a judgment against Denman who had
{

earlier sold real property on contract to a third party.

After

entry of the judgment Denman assigned his interest in the
contract to Heath.

When Dodson sought to execute on the
i

property, Heath filed an action to enjoin the sheriff's sale and
quiet title in her as against Dodson.

The Washington Supreme

Court held:
i

"It is the rule in this state that a judgment recovered
against a vendor of land, after the execution of a contract

i

3. May v. Emerson was followed in Heider v. Dietz, 380 P.2d
619 (Or. 1963). Heider contains a misleading headnote which
states: "Under 'equitable conversion,' vendors's security
interest in land is treated as personalty not reached by
docketing of judgment against vendor . . .." In fact, the headnote trumpets the appellant's contention but the Oregon Supreme
Court rejected that contention and held that the doctrine of
equitable conversion will not be applied "under facts making such
application clearly improper."
10

i

i

for its sale, but prior to the making and delivery of a
deed/ is a lien upon the legal title remaining in the vendor
and binds the land to the extent of the unpaid purchase
money . .. . ." (110 P., 2d at 847)
In Monroe v. Lincoln City Emp, Credit Union/ 279 N*W.2d
866 (Neb- 1979)/ the Olsons contracted to sell their property in
Lancaster County on June 29/ 1977.

In July, 1977, the credit

union filed suit against the Olsons and obtained a defauJt
judgment.

The credit union docketed the judgment in Lancaster

County on August 1/ 1977.

On August 8/ 1977/ the Olsons

transfered the property to the plaintiffs by warranty deed.

As

in the instant case/ the plaintiffs in Monroe argued that the
Olsons' interest in the property had been equitably converted
into personalty and therefore the judgment did not become a lien
against the realty.

The trial court agreed/ but the Nebraska

Supreme Court did not and reversed/ holding as follows*

ff

[T]he

doctrine of equitable conversion does not apply for all purposes
and in every situation where there is a contract for the purchase
of land.

[fl]Equitable conversion is merely

f

a name given to

results reached on other grounds/ not a fact from which we may
reason for all purposes and with respect to the rights of all
parties.1 Pound, The Progress of the Law, 33 Harvard L.Rev./ p.
813/ at p. 832.

The present case presents a situation where the

doctrine is clearly inapplicable."

(279 N.W.2d at 867-868)

The

Nebraska Supreme Court then stated the general rule that:
"Where a judgment is recovered in the district court
against the vendor of real estate in the same county/ who
has not made a deed for such real estate/ nor received the
whole of the purchase price therefor, such judgment is a
lien on whatever interest the vendor had in the land at the
time the lien attached."
(279 N.W.2d at 868)
' -

11

Mooring v. Brown/ 763 F.2d 386 (10th Cir. 1985), in
which the Tenth Circuit applied Colorado law, involves
substantially identical facts.

In that case the defendants

obtained a judgment against Cook in June 1981/ and recorded a
transcript of the judgment in Jefferson County on June 29/ 1981.
After the transcript of judgment was so recorded/ the defendants
learned that Cook was the record owner of a vacant lot in
Jefferson County.

Actually/ on April 5/ 1978/ Cook had entered

into an installment land contract with the Simpsons for the sale
of the lot.

On November 2, 1981/ Cook conveyed the lot by

warranty deed to the Simpsons.

The Simpsons later sold the

property to the plaintiffs/ and a warranty deed conveying the
same was recorded on March 4, 1982.

In April 1982 the defendants

commenced proceedings to levy and execute against the property in
partial satisfaction of their judgment lien.

In order to stop

the execution sale/ plaintiffs filed their action.

The Tenth

Circuit affirmed the trial court and held that under Colorado law
the holders of the judgment lien had a superior interest to that
of the grantees under the subsequent deed/ even though the

12

(

grantees acquired title from one who purchased the property on
contract from the judgment debtor prior to entry of the judgment.
See also/ Uffenheimer v. Rob Con Enterprises/ Inc./ 425
N.Y.S.2d 856 (1980), wherein the court states:

"It has long been

the rule in this State, as in most others/ that the vendor's
interest in realty under an executory contract of sale is subject
to judgment liens to the extent that the purchase money remains
unpaid."
In this case it is stipulated that Diane Hodge owed the
Barkers $87/747.40 under the Uniform Real Estate Contract to
purchase the Lockhart Road property at the time the Clements
docketed their judgment against the Barkers in Salt Lake County.
The Barkers owed $33/282.50 on the property to two financial
institutions.

That left the Barkers with a remaining interest in

the Lockhart Road property of $54,464.90/ and it is that amount
to which the Clements are entitled to recover-

4. In Mooring/ a title search was conducted and title
insurance was obtained for the benefit of the plaintiffs/ but the
search failed to reveal the existence of the judgment lien. In
the instant case/ a title search for the benefit of the
Cannefaxes did reveal the judgment lien but the title insurer
bound insurance anyway. Mooring does not address the issue of
equitable conversion/ but the court certainly did not apply the
doctrine.

13

B.
T-HE CASES CITED BY APPELLANTS WHICH DISCUSS THE DOCTRINE
OF EQUITABLE CONVERSION DO NOT SUPPORT THE PROPOSITION
THAT THE DOCTRINE MUST BE APPLIED IN ALL CASES
OR IN THIS CASE IN PARTICULAR

<

With the exception of Lach v. Deseret Bank/ 746 P.2d
802 (Utah App. 1987), the Utah cases cited in the Brief of

'

Plaintiffs-Appellants provide scant authority for the proposition
that the trial court ruled wrongly in the instant case.

Lach v.

Deseret Bank is discussed in subsection C. of this Argument.

*

Appellants cite In re Estate of Willson, 28 Utah 2d
197, 499 P.2d 1298 (1972).

In that case the court determined

that the interest of a deceased contract vendor was personal

{

property for the purposed of determining the amount of inheritance taxes due from the vendor's estate.

The court found that it

was equitable to apply the doctrine of equitable conversion
because the widow who wished her contract interest to be
considered real property had joined with her husband to sell the
property on contract.

The facts are so disparate to those of the

instant case that it is of no authority to a determination
whether the doctrine should apply in the instant case.
i

In Jelco, Incorporated v. Third Judicial District
Court, 29 Utah 2d 472, 511 P.2d 739 (1973), cited by appellants,
the issue invovlved the proper disbursement of funds deposited
i

into court by Salt Lake City in connection with an eminent domain
proceeding.

The contract vendee of the condemned land objected

to the trial court's order disbursing a portion of the deposited
funds to the contract vendor.

Merely as a preface to its

discussion, this court stated the general rule that the contract

14

«

vendee is in equity properly regarded as the owner of property
sold under an executory contract.

That is certainly true but the

rule is not one of universal, application.

The rule does usually

apply when the interests compared are those, of the vendor and
vendee.

The rule need not be applied when the interest of

third-party creditors is involved as is the instant situation.
Appellants also cite the case of Allred v. Allred, 15
Utah 2d 396, 393 P.2d 791 (1964), which correctly states that "As
a general rule an enforceable executory contract of sale has the
effect of converting the interest of the vendor of real property
to personalty."

393 P.2d at 792.

The opinion in that case also

acknowledges the rule that the doctrine of equitable conversion
should only be applied when it is equitable that it should apply.
Id.

There is nothing in Allred to support the conclusion that

the equitable conversion doctrine should apply to preclude a
judgment lien from attaching to a judgment debtor-contract
vendor's remaining interest—as measured by the amount owed him
on the contract when the lien attaches—in property sold on
contract.
Respondents acknowledge that the New Mexico case cited
by appellants, Marks v. City of Tucumcari, 595 P.2d 1199 (N.M.
1979), supports appellants.

The New Mexico Supreme Court applied

the doctrine of equitable conversion to facts similar to the
instant case without any apparant consideration of the competing
equities, if any.

It is just such mechanical adherence to a

legal fiction that respondents wish this court to avoid.

15

c.
LACH V. DESERET BANK WAS ERRONEOUSLY DECIDED
AND SHOULD BE OVERRULED

{

Appellants also cite and rely on Lach v. Deseret Bank/
746 P.2d 802 (Utah App. 1987).

Lach concludes, in part, that

under the doctrine of equitable conversion the vendor under a

{

binding earnest money agreement does not own an interest in real
property to which a judgment lien can attach.

This is, of

course/ contrary to the ruling of the trial court in this action.
However/ this court is not bound by the Court of
Appeals1 decision/ and Lach should be overruled.

The applicable

holding in Lach is dicta; it is not well reasoned or supported by.
the cases cited in the opinion; and most importantly/ it
conflicts with this court's opinion in Butler v. Wilkinson/
supra, 740 P.2d 1244.
1.
The Lach Discussion on Equitable Conversion is Dicta
The Lach opinion f s discussion of the doctrine of
equitable conversion is dicta.

<

The facts discussed in Lach

indicate that on November 28, 1980, an earnest money receipt and
offer to purchase agreement, for the purchase of certain property

\

in Garfield County, was signed on November 28, 1980, by the
Dewsnups as sellers and David Lach as buyer.

On the same date

the Dewsnups gave a quit-claim deed to the subject property in

(

favor of Foothill Properties, a name under which David Lach
conducted business.

On December 12, 1980, Deseret Bank docketed

a judgment againt the Dewsnups in Garfield County.
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In part III of the Lach opinion/ the Court of Appeals
correctly held that "A judgment creditor cannot place a lien
against the property of a judgment debtor f s grantee."
at 804.

746 P.2d

Since the judgment debtors quitclaimed the property to

Lach before the judgment was docketed in Garfield County/ the
property no longer legally belonged to the judgment debtors.

The

discussion in part IV of the opinion, concerning equitable
conversion/ was thus unnecessary to a resolution of the appeal.
2.
Lach Conflicts With Butler v. Wilkinson
In Butler v. Wilkinson/ supra, 740 P.2d 1244, this
court expressly recognized the propriety of a judgment lien
against the interest retained by a contract vendor.

As discussed

earlier in this brief/ the Butler v. Wilkinson opinion states:
". . . A vendee who voluntarily assigns or sells his
equitable interest to a third person . . . does not be the
assignment/ [or] sale . . . extinguish creditors1 judgment
liens that attached during the vendee's ownership of the
equitable interest. [Citations]. Nor, for that matter/ is a
judgment lien against the vendor's interest extinguished by
the vendor's sale of that interest to a third person.
[Citations]." (740 P.2d at 1257-1258)
The Lach discussion of equitable conversion cannot be
reconciled with this court's statement to the contrary in Butler
v. Wilkinson.
3.
The Cases Cited in the Lach Discussion of Equitable Conversion
Do Not Compel the Conclusion Reached by
The Court of Appeals
The cases cited in the Lach discussion of equitable
conversion provide scant authority for the conclusion reached by
the Court of Appeals.

The Lach opinion correctly cites Bunnell

17

v. Bills, 13 Utah 2d 83, 368 P.2d 597, 599 (1962), for the
proposition that an earnest money agreement is a legally binding
executory contract for the sale of real property.

{

However,

Bunnell does not discuss the doctrine of equitable conversion,
nor does it involve any issue about the validity of a judgment

{

lien.
The other cases relied upon by the Court of Appeals are
the same cases cited by appellants in their brief:

Allred v.

Allred, supra 15, Utah 2d 396, 393 P.2d 791; In re Estate of
Willson, supra, 28 Utah 2d 197, 499 P.2d 1298; and Jelco, Incorporated v. Third Judicial District Court, supra, 29 Utah 2d 472,
511 P.2d 739.
As discussed in part B. of this Argument, those cases
apply the doctrine of equitable conversion, but on facts not at

i

all similar to those of the instant case.
D.
THERE IS NO INEQUITY IN A RULE PERMITTING A JUDGMENT LIEN
TO ATTACH TO THE REMAINING INTEREST OF A
JUDGMENT DEBTOR-CONTRACT VENDOR

,

Utah's judgment lien statute, U.C.A. § 78-22-1,
evidences a strong public policy in favor of satisfaction of
judgments.

<

Indeed, a judgment lien has always been regarded as

the highest form of security to a creditor. Belnap v. Blain, 575
5
P.2d 696, 700 (Utah 1978).
A judgment creditor's lien on the

5. Belnap is indicative of the deference given to a judgment
lien. In that case, this court held that a judgment lien
attached to a debtor's property despite the fact that prior
encumberances exceeded the market value of the property.
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\

property interest of his debtor should not be disregarded based
on a legal fiction in the absence of strong equitable considerations in favor of the debtor or his grantee.
In the instant case there are no such equitable
considerations • When the Barkers gave a warranty deed to Diane
Hodge (after the Clements1 judgment against the Barkers had been
docketed)/ Hodge had constructive notice of the existence of the
judgment lien.
Cannefax.

So did Hodge1s grantees/ Raymond and Debra

In fact/ prior to recording the deeds from the Barkers

to Hodge and from Hodge to the Cannefaxes/ the settlement agent/
Security Title Agency, did a title search which disclosed the
Clements1 judgment.

At that point Hodge and the Cannefaxes/

through their agent, had actual knowledge of the judgment.

At

that point in time Hodge or the Cannefaxes were in a position to
protect themselves by insisting that the judgment lien be
cleared.

Security Title could have refused to bind title

insurance on the property or could have excepted the judgment
lien from coverage.

Instead/ for whatever reason/ the settlement

agent chose to ignore the judgment/ bind title insurance on the
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property, and record the deeds.
The Clements recognize that their judgment lien was
subject to existing equities of third parties in the land.

For

that reason, the Clements acknowledge that they are entitled to
foreclose on their judgment lien only to the extent that Diane
Hodge still owed the Barkers on the Uniform Real Estate Contract,
less the amount of prior encumberances on the property, at time
of delivery of the warranty deed from the Barkers to her.

Thus,

Hodge did not risk the loss of her equity in the property.

In

other contexts this court has held that a judgment lien attaches
to a debtors property only to the extent that the value of the
property exceeds exempt amounts.

See, e.g., Gray v. Stevens, 5

Utah 2d 361, 302 P.2d 273 (1956) (judgment lien attached to value
of homestead property in excess of amount of homestead
exemption) .
On the other hand, a rule recognizing the doctrine of
equitable conversion in a case where the judgment debtor has
retained legal title but sold the property on contract prior to
docketing the judgment provides what may be a fool-proof method

6. As stated by the trial court in ruling on the Clements1
summary judgment motion: "Now, the question is, if the Court is
to be persuaded to rule under equitable doctrines, what is or
what isn't equitable? Who was in the better position to
anticipate the ultimate implications of that cloud on title, and
to deal with it at the time of purchase of the property by the
plaintiffs in this case?" The transcript of the hearing on the
motion is a part of the Addendum to this brief. While it is not
a part of the record, the fact is the Clements (and their
counsel) did not know of the existence of the Lockhart Road
property until November 1986, more than a year after the real
estate closing.
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for many judgment debtors to dictate the terms by which his or
her creditor must accept payment on the judgment.

If a contract

vendor's only remaining interest is the right to receive the
proceeds under the contract of sale/ an otherwise judgment-proof
debtor can sell his non-exempt real property on contract for a
fair consideration but under terms calling for only minimal or
modest installment payments.

By such a tact/ the debtor can

limit his judgment creditor to small monthly payments toward
satisfaction of the judgment.
In fact; appellants and the Lach court were wrong in
concluding that a vendor's only remaining interest in property
sold on contract is the right to receive the proceeds under the
contract of sale.

The contract vendor retains legal title for

his own benefit/ subject to his vendee's interest.

Unlike the

trutee under a resulting or constructive trust/ he retains the
right to sell that legal title/ subject to the vendee's interest.
He retains a right to regain possession of the property upon
default in payments by his vendee/ and he retains the right to
prevent the vendee from committing waste to the property while
the contract is executory.
For much the same reasons/ it is also inaccurate to
characterize the vendor's remaining interest as "naked legal
title.'1

As pointed out in Belnap v. Blaifi/ supra, 575 P.2d 696/

at 699, the phrase "naked legal title" refers to those situations
where the legal title holder has no beneficial interest/ such as
where the title holder is the trustee of an express/
constructive, or.resulting trust.
21

As discussed/ the doctrine of equitable conversion is
only applied when to do so is necessary to reach an equitable
result.

Allred v. M i r e d , supra, 393 P.2d 791.

{

In Security

State Bank v. Luebke, 737 P.2d 586 (Or. 1987), the Oregon Supreme
Court considered and rejected application of the doctrine of
equitable conversion.

In that case it became necessary to

determine the meaning of "ownership" in the context of a statute
enacted in 1917 which provided that "Foreclosure of a mortgage on
real property is not barred by [the 10 year statute of limitations] when . . .

(2) the original mortgagor still owns the

mortgaged property."

The opinion states:

"Although courts uniformly applied the equitable
conversion doctrine to the vendor-purchaser relationship
. . . the doctrine did not necessarily carry over into cases
involving third party creditors.
'Neither this court nor other courts actually apply the
doctrine of equitable conversion automatically.
Equitable conversion is not invoked unless it appears
necessary to invoke it in a particular case in order to
accomplish equity . . .' Heider v. Dietz, 234 Or. 105,
112-15, 380 P.2d 619 (19637*
. . . In 'other than vendor-purchaser cases, 1 the
equitable conversion doctrine was not 'automatically
applie[d] in every instance of a land-sale contract 1 .
[Citation] Specifically, the state of the law in 1917 was
that a subsequent purchaser was not regarded as the 'owner'
for all purposes; . . . a judgment creditor of the vendor
had a lien on the land to the extent of the unpaid purchase
price. This is consistent with the self-evident rule that
equitable remedies are only granted 'in a particular case in
order to accomplish equity according to established rules of
equity jurisprudence.' Heider v. Dietz, supra, 234 Or. at
112, 380 P.2d 619. For the reasons discussed above, we hold
that use of the equitable conversion doctrine to determine
'ownership' under ORS 88.120 is inappropriate. For the
purpose of ORS 88.120, Luebke 'still owns the mortgaged
property.'"
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Respondents Donald and Ruth Clement submit that
appellants are asking this court to apply the doctrine of
equitable conversion in an "automatic" fashion v/ithout analysis
of whether the facts of the case made It an appropriate one for
application of the doctrine.

The equitable conversion doctrine

has never been a "hard and fast" rule and should not become one.
CONCLUSION
Based on the stipulated facts and the arguments set
forth in this brief, respondents Donald and Ruth Clement respectfully submit that this court should affirm the Order and Summary
Judgment entered by the trial court, and submit that they should
be awarded their costs on appeal.
Lted this
'A day of July, 1988.
Dated
this -^^ 'r\

NYGAARD, COKE & VINCENT

By / jfom /f^#A-^

Steven H. Lybberjf
Attorneys for Respondents
Donald W. Clement and Ruth L.
Clement
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ADDENDUM
j

1.

UTAH CODE ANN. § 78-22-1

2.

STIPULATED FACTS

3.

REPORTER'S TRANSCRIPT OF PROCEEDINGS [ON DEFENDANTS1 MOTION
FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT]

4.

ORDER AND SUMMARY JUDGMENT

I

(

(

(

i

i

i
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UTAH CODE ANN. § 78-22-1
From the time the judgment of the district court or
circuit court is docketed and filed in the office of the
clerk of the district court of the county it becomes a lien
upon all the real property of the judgment debtor, not
exempt from execution, in the county in which the judgment
is entered, owned by him at the time or by him thereafter
acquired during the existence of said lien.

A transcript of

judgment rendered in a district court or circuit court of
this state, in any county thereof, may be filed and docketed
in the office of the clerk of the district court of any
other county, and when so filed and docketed it shall have,
for purposes of lien and enforcement, the same force and
effect as a judgment entered in the district court in such
county.

The lien shall continue for eight years unless the

judgment is previously satisfied or unless the enforcement
of the judgment is stayed on appeal by the execution of a
sufficient undertaking as provided by law, in which case the
lien of the judgment ceases.

BRUCE E. COKE, Bar No. 0694
STEVEN H. LYBBERT, Bar No. 4187
NYGAARD, COKE & VINCENT
Attorneys for Defendants
333 North 300 West
Salt Lake City, Utah 84103
Telephone: (801) 328-2506
IN THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT OF SALT LAKE COUNTY
STATE OF UTAH
RAYMOND P.L. CANNEFAX and
DEBRA CANNEFAX,

]
STIPULATED FACTS

Plaintiffs,

]

vs.
DONALD W. CLEMENT and RUTH L.
CLEMENT,
Defendants.

)
]
1
]

Civil No. C87-6232
Judge Pat B. Brian

Plaintiffs, by and through their attorney, Rodney M.
Pipella, and defendants, by and through their attorneys, Steven
H. Lybbert and Bruce E. Coke of Nygaard, Coke & Vincent, stipulate
to the following facts.

In doing so, counsel agree that other

facts not stipulated to may be relevant to the issues raised in
the pleadings.
STIPULATED FACTS
1.

On August 28, 1981, George W. Barker, Jr. and Lila

M. Barker ("the Barkers") were fee simple owners of the real
property described in paragraph 5 of plaintiffs' Verified
Complaint ("the Lockhart Road property").

2.

On August 28, 1981, the Barkers entered into a

Uniform Real Estate Contract with Diane Hodge for sale of the
Lockhart Road property for the sum of $160,000.00, payable
$40,000.00 down and the balance over a period of time with
interest.
3.

At the time of the contract sale from the Barkers

to Diane Hodge, there existed prior mortgage loan obligations
against the property in favor of Prudential Federal Savings &
Loan Association ("Prudential") and Continental Bank and Trust
Company ("Continental").
4.

On August 31, 1981, Ms. Hodge caused a Notice of

Contract to be recorded with the Salt Lake County Recorder as
Entry No. 3600195 at Book 5287, Page 315.
5.

On August 15, 1985, defendants Donald W. Clement

and Ruth L. Clement obtained a Judgment in the Seventh Judicial
District Court of Uintah County against the Barkers in the
amount of $70,526.00.
6.

On August 19, 1985, defendants1 Judgment was

docketed with the Clerk of the Third Judicial District Court of

{

Salt Lake County in Docket Book 200 at Page 153.
7.

Defendants1 Judgment against the Barkers was not

appealed.

<
8.

On September 25, 1985, iiwediately prior to the

transaction described in the paragraphs which follow, the Barkers
held legal title to the Lockhart Road property, subject to Diane

<

-2(

Hodge*s interest under the Uniform Real Estate Contract.1
9.

On September 25, 1985, Diane Hodge owed $87,747.40

under the Uniform Real Estate Contract to the Barkers.

The prior

obligations to Prudential and Continental totaled $33,282.50.
10.

On September 25, 1985, the Barkers gave a Warranty

Deed to the Property to Diane Hodge.

The Warranty Deed was

recorded with the Salt Lake County Recorder on September 26, 1985
as Entry No. 4142674 at Book No. 5694, beginning at Page 1268.
11.

On September 25, 1985, at the time of delivery of

the Warranty Deed referred to in paragraph 10, Diane Hodge paid
the Barkers $45,000.00, and the Barkers gave Ms. Hodge a credit
of $9,464.94.

The mortgage loan balance in favor of Prudential

in the sum of $5,960.20 was paid off, as was the mortgage loan
balance in favor of Continental in the sum of $27,322.30.
12.

Also on September 25, 1985, Diane

Hodge gave a

Warranty Deed to the Property to plaintiffs Raymond P.L. Cannefax
and Debra Cannefax.

The Warranty Deed was recorded with the Salt

Lake County Recorder on September 26, 1985, as Entry No. 4142675
at Book No. 5694, beginning at Page 1270.
13.

The two transactions discussed above—the transfer

of title from the Barkers to Diane Hodge, and the transfer of
title from Diane Hodge to plaintiffs—took place at a single real
estate closing.

A true and correct copy of the U.S. Department

1. After entering into the contract with Ms. Hodge, the Barkers
gave quit claim deeds to the property to other people named
Barker—presumably their children. On or before September 25,
1985, but prior to the other transactions of September 25, the
Barkers received back quit claim deeds to the property from their
quit claim grantees.

-3-

of Housing and Urban Development Settlement Statement between
Diane Hodge and plaintiffs is attached hereto.
14.

A title search conducted by the settlement agent,

Surety Title Agency, between closing on September 25, 1985 and
recording on September 26, 1985 disclosed defendants1 Judgment
against the Barkers.
Dated this JZ)A

day of December, 1987.

Ro£rtS*V M. Pipella
Attorney for Plaintiffs

Dated this J~*

day of December, 1987.
NYGAARD, COKE & VINCENT
By

/ ^ H ^
SCeven H. Lybtfert
Attorneys for Defendants

IN THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT OF SALT LAKE COUNTY
STATE OF UTAH
* * *

RAYMOND P . L . CANNEFAX and
DE3RA CANNEFAX,
Plaintiffs,

Civil No. C87-6232
-vs-

Honorable Pat B. Brian

DONALD W. CLEMENT and RUTH
L. CLEMENT,

DEFENDANTS* MOTION FOR
SUMMARY JUDGMENT

Defendants.
* * *

REPORTER'S TRANSCRIPT OF PROCEEDINGS
Salt Lake City, Utah
February 29, 1988
* * *

APPEARANCES:
For the Plaintiffs:

RODNEY M. PIPELLA
643 East First South
Salt Lake City, Utah 84102

For the Defendants.

STEVEN 3. LYBBSRT
350 South 400 East
Salt Lake City, Utah 34111

BRAD J. YOUNG
OFFICIAL COURT REPORTER

COPY

1

P R O C E E D I N G S

2
3-

THE COURT:

Cannefax vs. Clement, C87-6232.

Counsel

will state an appearance for the record, please,

4

MR. LYBBERT:

Steven Lybbert for the defendants.

5

MR. PIPELLA:

Rodney Pipella for the plaintiffs.

6

THE COURT:

7

MR. LYBBERT:

You may proceed.
We would move for summary judgment

8

both as to the complaint and on the counterclaim for

9

declaratory relief that has been filed.

The parties have, I

10

believe, stipulated —

11

I think the facts they have stipulated to are sufficient to

12

resolve all the issues involved on both the complaint and

13

counterclaim.

14

they certainly stipulated to facts, and

Briefly, to paraphrase those facts, Mr. and

15

Mrs. Barker owned a piece of property.

They entered into a

16

uniform real estate contract with Dianne Hodge to sell that

17

property.

18

obtained a judgment against the Barkers, and docketed that

19

judgment in Salt Lake County.

20

judgment had been docketed Dianne Hodge paid off the contract

21

and obtained a deed to the property, and on that same day she

22

sold the property again by warranty deed to the plaintiffs,

23

the Cannefaxes.

24

warranty deed from the Barkers, and at the time that she gave

25

a warranty deed to the plaintiffs, the Cannefaxes, she owed

Thereafter, the defendants, Mr. and Mrs. Clement,

About a month after the

At the time that Dianne Hodge obtained her

about $88,000 on the contract.

There was $33,000,

approximately, owing to a couple of lenders who had first and
second position.
off.

At the closing those two lenders were paid

The Barkers gave Dianne Hodge a $9,000 credit, and she

paid the remaining $45,000 to the Barkers.
judgment lien —

The fact that the

excuse me, the fact that the judgment had

been docketed was discovered between closing and recording of
the various deeds the next day.
THE COURT:

So there is

—

What was the amount of the judgment

obtained by the plaintiffs?
MR. LYBBERT:

Approximately $70,000.

I believe the issue is whether that judgment, when
it was docketed in Salt Lake County, became a lien on the
interest that the Barkers retained in the property —
certainly had legal title to the property —

they

it is my position

and I believe that the case law and treatises support me, that
the general rule is that when a judgment is obtained against a
person who owns property, who has sold that property on
contract, then the lien attaches to the property, to the
extent that the contract remains unpaid, which in this case,
as of the date that they had actual knowledge of the judgment
and the fact it had been docketed in Salt Lake County, it
was —

after you take away the $33,000 that was owed to the

two prior lenders, that leaves $54,000.
I believe the determinative case is Butler vs.

1

Wilkinson, which is discussed in both my memorandum and my

2

reply to Plaintiff's opposition to the motion.

3

recognizes the possibility of a judgment lien against the

4

contract vendor's interest, and clearly states that a judgment

5

lien against the vendor's interest is not extinguished by the

6

vendor's sale of that interest to a third person.

7

It clearly

My memorandum will certainly go into more detail

8

than I want to now, unless you want more detail.

I feel

9

confident that the memoranda that I submitted states my

10

position pretty clearly.

11

Clements' remedy should have been to perhaps garnish Dianne

12

Hodge, but that ignores the fact they didn't know that the

13

Barkers owned this property, this particular piece of

14

property, until after they docketed their judgment in Salt

15

Lake County, and in fact after —

16

then been sold —

or a deed had been given from the Barkers to

17

the Hodges and —

the Barkers to Dianne Hodge and from Dianne

18

Hodge to the Cannefaxes.

19

THE COURT:

The plaintiffs suggest that the

long after the property had

Counsel, one more time, in addition to

20

the factual transaction, outline for the Court, put the dates

21

in.

22

indicate the dates when the Clements 1 obtained their judgment,

23

when it was recorded, and then when the property was sold

24

again.

25

Start from the time that the Barkers sell, and then

MR. LYBBERT:

The Barkers sold the property on

1

contract on August 28, 1981.

2

THE COURT:

3

MR. LYBBERT:

4

THE COURT:

5

MR. LYBBERT:

6

THE COURT:

7

MR. LYBBERT:

8
9
10
11
12

And that sale was to Hodges?
Right, to Hodge.

And that was when?
August 28, 1981.

Go ahead.
On August 15, 1985, the Clements

obtained their judgment for $70,526.
THE COURT:

Was it recorded again?

MR. LYBBERT:

It was recorded or docketed in Salt

Lake County four days later, on August 19, 1985.
THE COURT:

The Clements obtained and recorded a

13

judgment for how much?

14

MR. LYBBERT:

15

THE COURT:

16

MR. LYBBERT:

17

THE COURT:

18

MR. LYBBERT:

19

THE COURT:

20

MR. LYBBERT:

$70,526.

Against?
Mr. and Mrs. George Barker.
Both?
Yes.

!
!
i

21

And that occurred on what date?
They obtained the.judgment on August

15, 1985, and that was in Uintah County.

22

THE COURT:

23

MR. LYBBERT:

24

THE COURT:

25

MR. LYBBERT:

It is the recording that's critical.
August 19, 1985.

August 19, 1985?
Correct.

5

1

THE COURT:

Go ahead.

2

MR. LYBBERT:

Take it on through.

About 36 days later, on September 25,

3

1985, the Barkers gave a warranty deed to Dianne Hodge, and on

4

that same day and immediately thereafter Dianne Hodge gave a

5

warranty deed to Mr. and Mrs. Cannefax.

6
7

THE COURT:
what, September

The Barkers gave their warranty deed on

—

8

MR. LYBBERT:

9

THE COURT:

1985?

10

MR. LYBBERT:

11

THE COURT:

12

MR. LYBBERT:

13

Correct.
To the Clements?
No, to Dianne Hodge.

The Clements are

the judgment creditors.

14

THE COURT:

15

MR. LYBBERT:

16

25.

What did she do with it?
On that same day she gave a warranty

deed to the plaintiffs in this action, Mr. and Mrs. Cannefax.

17

THE COURT:

18

MR. LYBBERT:

19

THE COURT:

20

MR. LYBBERT:

On what date?
Also September 25, 1985.
Go ahead.
Those are the dates and transactions

21

that the parties have stipulated to.

It is not in the

22

stipulated facts, but then it was probably late 1987, fall of

23

1987, that the Clements discovered the existence of this

24

property, and sought to foreclose on the judgment lien, and in

25

response the Cannefaxes brought this action to find that they

1

have title

~

2

THE COURT:

Superior

3

MR- LYBBERT:

4

THE COURT:

5

MR. LYBBERT:

—

Superior to the judgment lien.
Go ahead.
Back then, on September 25, 1985,

6

there was a balance due on that uniform real estate contract

7

of approximately —

8

there were obligations owed to two different lending

9

institutions, totaling $33,000.

I think it was $88,000.

And at that time

So it is my position that the

10

Barkers, as of the date that —

11

as of the date they gave the deed to Hodge, still had an

12

interest attached by the judgment lien of $54,000,

13

THE COURT:

14

MR. LYBBERT:

15

THE COURT:

16
17
18

Is that the amount in dispute today?
Yes.
So the Clements are now trying to go

against the property in the amount of $54,000?
MR. LYBBERT:

That f s correct.

I am rounding

everything to the nearest thousand.

19

THE COURT:

20

MR. LYBBERT:

21

THE COURT:

22

MR. LYBBERT:

23

THE COURT:

24

MR. PIPELLA:

25

the judgment debtors, Barkers,

Against the Cannefaxes?
Yes.
Anything further?
No.
Counsel?
Your Honor, the argument of the

Cannefaxes is that at the time the uniform real estate

1

contract was entered into, in August of 1981, between the

2

Barkers and Dianne Hodge, that equitable conversion took

3

place, the theory of equitable conversion should be applied to

4

determine the interest of the parties on that date, and for

5

the remainder of the life of the contract.

6
7

THE COURT:
accomplished on this?

8
9

What would have a title check

MR. PIPELLA:

The title check at that time would

have disclosed that the Barkers held title to the property.

10

Dianne Hodge at the time that she bought the property in

11

August of 1981 had recorded a notice of interest, disclosing

12

the interest of her contract.

13

THE COURT:

But supposing that on the morning of the

14

transaction, September 25, 1985, there had been an update on

15

the title policy, would not the recorded lien have been

16

exposed?

17

MR. PIPELLA:

Your Honor, I think as part of the

18

stipulated facts the title company that had done the date.

19

down, from the date of the prior commitment to the date of

20

closing, did discover the Clement judgment as being docketed

21

against the Barkers.

22

THE COURT:

23

MR. PIPELLA:

Doesn't that put a buyer on notice?
Your Honor, our position is that

24

equitable conversion makes Dianne Hodge the owner of the real

25

property, and that what the Barkers had at the time they

executed the contract was a personal property interest, a
security Interest.
THE COURT:

Supposing they had backed out on the

deal.
MR. PIPELLA:
THE COURT:

Who had backed out on the deal?
The Barkers.

Would they not still have

retained title of the property subject to the recorded lien?
MR. PIPELLA:

They couldn't have backed out on the

deal after August of 1981.
THE COURT:
MR. PIPELLA:

Why not?
Because they had entered into a

uniform real estate contract and they owed Dianne Hodge the
deed.

If she performed, she could have sued for specific

performance.
THE COURT:

If for some reason they had developed

sellers1 remorse or some other problem arose and they said,
Sue us, we don't want to go through with this deal, we have an
emotional attachment to the property, we want to give it to
our grandchildren, we don't want to go through with it, you
sue us, what would have been the basis for the lawsuit, absent
an action for specific performance?
MR. PIPELLA:

What would have been

—

Dianne Hodge bought the property, and

was entitled to obtain the benefit of her bargain.

The

uniform real estate contract provides three separate remedies
in paragraph 16, section 16, for nonperformance.

Paragraph

9

1

16(a) provides a forfeiture provision, (b) allows the seller

2

to sue the buyer for back installments, and paragraph 16(c)

3

allows the contract seller to convey title and foreclose on

4

the title as a mortgage —

5

mortgage.

6

time that the Clements obtained their judgment, Dianne Hodge

7

had paid 50 percent of the purchase price,

8
9

foreclose on the contract as a

At the time, in September or August of 1985, at the

THE COURT:

When did she enter into the contract

with the Barkers?

10

MR. PIPELLA:

11

THE COURT:

12

MR. PIPELLA:

13

THE COURT:

14

MR. PIPELLA:

15

THE COURT:

In 1981.
When?
August.
When?
August 29.
That was the day after —

that was

16

several days after the judgment was recorded against the

17

property?

18

MR. PIPELLA:

No.

Dianne Hodge bought the property

19

in August of 1981.

The Clements docketed their judgment in

20

August of 1985, four years later.

21

September of 1985, roughly 30 days following the docketing of

22

the Clements' judgment in Salt Lake County, resold the

23

property to my clients.

24

Cannefaxes refinanced the property, and paid cash.

25

Dianne Hodge had enough money to pay off the Cannefaxes.

And then Dianne Hodge, in

In that resale transaction, the
Therefore,
She

10

1

paid them off in 1985, on a contract, that she had entered

2

into with in 1981.

3

the property, had paid taxes.

4

backed out at that particular point in time.

5

used it as her residence for four or five years.

6

Dianne Hodge had been in the possession of
The Barkers couldn't have
Dianne Hodge had

Our argument, your Honor, is at the time the uniform

7

real estate contract is entered into, in August of 1981, that

8

Dianne Hodge became the owner of the real property, and the

9

doctrine of equitable conversion so states.

The doctrine of

10

equitable conversion is well described in the Butler vs.

11

Wilkinson case, which is cited in both of our memorandums.

12

The uniform real estate contract is characterized in Butler

13

vs. Wilkinson as a financing instrument, with the interest of

14

the vendor, in this case the Barkers, being that as a

15

mortgagee, just like any other mortgage holder.

16

personal property interest.

17

and in Butler vs. Wilkinson they discuss that ownership

18

interest.

19

are required to obtain insurance.

20

damaged or destroyed, they would be the ones that would suffer

21

that loss post-contract.

22

right to occupy the property.

23

THE COURT:

24
25

You have a

The vendee is really the owner,

They have the risk of loss.

They are the ones that

If the property were

They are also the ones that have the

Had she in fact been in occupancy

exclusively for that four-year period of time?
MR. PIPELLA:

When the contract closed in 1981, she

11

1

moved in and used it for her residence.

At the time that she

2

sold the property to my clients, she and her husband I believe

3

had been transferred out of state, and were living in

4

Minnesota, which I believe is where they were contacted

5

isn't it Minnesota?

6

MR. LYBBERT:

That's correct,

7

MR. PIPELLA:

Living in Minnesota in 1985.

8

been occupying the property.

9

this case, we are —

—

She had

Now, in the instant case, in

if you follow Mr. Lybbert f s arguments, we

10

are asked to treat a contract different than other security

11

interests in a particular piece of property.

12

estate contract, in our position, your Honor, is nothing more

13

than another method to finance the sale of property.

14

should be treated as such.

15

with judgment liens and when and on what property they become

16

judgments, what property they become liens once docketed,

17

describes that the judgment becomes a lien on the real

18

property owned by the judgment debtor.

19

client —

20

can look at that word "owner" and say that there were two

21

owners of the real property at the time that the Clements

22

docketed their judgment.

23
24
25

And it

Utah code, at 78-22-1, dealing

Dianne Hodge was the owner.

THE COURT:

A uniform real

Your Honor, my
I don't think that we

Do you have a legal and an equitable

owner?
MR. PIPELLA:

Yes.

You have an equitable owner of

12

the real property, which was Dianne Hodge.

And the Barkers at

that time had a security interest in the contract.

At the

time the judgment was*docketed, Dianne Hodge had paid almost
50 percent of the property value.
THE COURT:

Whose name was the property still in?

MR. PIPELLA:

The property in 1985, at the time the

judgment was docketed, title was still vested in the Barkers.
THE COURT:
it —

The Court's next question is, would

do not the recording statutes operate to put a buyer on

notice that even up until the moment the transaction is
finalized there ought to be an update on the title check of
the property?

Wouldn't an addendum to the title of that

property have reflected and sent up red flags to your clients
that the title to the property they were buying was
encumbered, there was a cloud on it, there was a question
about ownership?
MR. PIPELLA:

Well, the ownership, your Honor —

the

answer to your question is yes, because there in fact was a
search done, and they did search the title name, the Barkers
and Dianne Hodge, and they searched the title judgment docket
records for the name of my client as well.
THE COURT:

Did the recorded judgment

MR. PIPELLA:

—

The docketed judgment I believe did

show up in that search.
THE COURT:

What would a reasonable, prudent buyer

13

1

do in that case?

2

that property to impound funds or to take other steps to

3

guaranty the full value of the purchase?

4

Wouldn't they have required the seller of

MR. PIPELLA:

Your Honor, my clients weren't aware

5

of the docketing of the judgment.

6

company that closed the transaction was their agent, was also

7

the agent for Dianne Hodge.

8

real estate contract is a financing instrument, and Dianne

9

Hodge was the equitable owner of the real property, and the

10

Now, the title insurance

Our position is that if a uniform

Barkers held the personal property interest

11

THE COURT:

12

MR. PIPELLA:

—

And were the legal owners.
Had fee title —

not fee title, but

13

record title —

that the docketing of the judgment says it is

14

a lien against real property owned by the judgment debtor.

15

this particular point in time, all that the Barkers had was a

16

security interest, and it was personal property.

17

requesting and our point is that if Barkers had given a deed

18

and taken back a note and deed of trust, we wouldn't be having

19

this particular argument.

20

taken back an all-inclusive note and deed of trust and wrapped

21

the two prior encumbrances, we wouldn't be having this

22

argument.

23

to treat it any differently than you would where the seller,

24

the vendor, had given a deed and taken back a note and deed of

25

trust.

At

What I am

Or if they had given a deed and

It is inequitable, where you have a contract sale,

In both cases, your Honor, where he had taken back a

14

1

note and deed of trust or had sold the property on contract/

2

he has the identical interest.

3

interest in the property itself, and the judgment doesn't

4

attach.

5

He has a personal property

One of the items that Mr. Lybbert and the defendants

6

don't bring up is that what if Dianne Hodge had just

7

accelerated her payments?

8

would her exposure be?

9

makes every installment, to run and have the title checked?

10

What if she had paid it off?

What

Is it incumbent on her, before she
I

assert, your Honor, that --

11

THE COURT:

12

MR. PIPELLA:

Judgment against the property.
In this case it is a judgment against

13

the seller.

But it puts the contract buyer in a position

14

where they can't freely make the payments and can't freely

15

deal with the seller for fear that a judgment comes of record

16

against the seller, and they have to go down and check the

17

record every time they make a payment.

18

come into a windfall and had made the payment in this

19

particular case, we may still be having the very same

20

argument.

21

You have to treat the contract buyer as the owner of the real

22

property, treat the seller as a mortgagee.

23

In this particular case the Barkers —

24

defaulted in August of 1985, the Barkers, according to the

25

terms of the contract, would have to have conveyed the

If Dianne Hodge had

That, your Honor, is inequitable.

It is unfair.

That's what he is.

if Dianne Hodge had

15

1

property, according to the terms of section 16(c), to Dianne

2

Hodge, and then foreclosed on the property as a mortgage.

3

Your Honor, I assert that what the —

that what the

4

Barkers had at the time was only a personal property interest,

5

and that the cases that have been cited on our behalf describe

6

the interest•

7

principally are Butler vs. Wilkinson, in re: Willson's estate,

8

and Allred vs. Allred.

9

describes the interest of the contract seller.

The three cases that we have relied upon

In those three cases, your Honor, it
The interest

10

of the contract seller is personal property, is that of a

11

mortgagee.

12

The statute 78-22-1 says real property owned by the

13

judgment debtor.

14

the cases that we have cited, and apply that to 78-22-1, in

15

determining whether or not —

16

against whom would a judgment attach as a lien to the

17

property, I think the only conclusion is, your Honor, that the

18

real property interest was held by Dianne Hodge, and the fact

19

that a judgment was docketed against the Barkers prior to the

20

time she paid them off and took the deed should be treated

21

just as if the Barkers held a mortgage on the property.

22

If we have —

if we are to give effect to

you know, who is the owner, and

In that particular case, if they held a mortgage on

23

the property, held a security interest, then a judgment

24

docketed against them would not be a lien on the property.

25

Your Honor, I am saying if there was a mortgage, it should be

16

treated just like —

pardon me, the mere fact there was a

contract shouldn't make any difference to our determination
here.

The contract, as far as the Barkers were concerned,

should be treated as a mortgage.
THE COURT:

Supposing the buyer had defaulted

someplace along the line, they had been in possession of the
property four or five years, and fall on hard times, and
defaulted, then what is the legal position of the original
seller?
MR. PIPELLA:

Sir, your Honor, depending on the

amount of the payment that has been received, I can't quote
you chapter and verse from the Utah cases that establish when
a forfeiture is proper, but part of the problem we are faced
with here is that these land sale contracts have been treated
as executory contracts.

If there is a default by the buyer,

the seller is excused from performance.

In Utah, dealing with

land sale contracts, it is not always true that the s e l l e r s
performance is excused by a default by the buyer.

In this

particular case, Dianne Hodge paid 25 percent down when she
bought the property in 1981.
She paid $40,000 down.

It was $160,000 purchase price.

And depending on if —

depending on

the date that she would have defaulted after that, it is
highly unlikely that one month following the date of her
default that the Court would have allowed a forfeiture.
THE COURT:

What about four years?

17

1

MR. PIPELLA:

Your Honor, she had paid more money

2

after four years, because by the time we got to September of

3

1985, she had reduced that $120,000 balance that was on the

4

contract in August of 1981 down to $87,000.

5

almost 50 percent of the purchase price in four years.

6

under no circumstances would a Utah court allow a forfeiture

7

when the buyer had paid 50 percent of the purchase price over

8

four years.

9

on that contract like a mortgage, utilizing 16(c).

10

She had paid
And

The Court would require that the seller foreclose

Our position is that —

as well as one of the other

11

points we make in our memorandums, was that the contract was

12

no longer executory, in that performance, default in August of

13

1985, at the time that the Clements obtained their judgment,

14

would not have excused the Barkers 1 performance.

15

have foreclosed on Dianne Hodge at that time, the contract

16

required and the Utah case law would have required them to

17

convey the property to Dianne Hodge and foreclose on that

18

contract as a mortgage, pursuant to 16(c) of that contract.

19

And so the contract was not even an executory contract in

20

August of 1985.

21

THE COURT:

In order to

As a practical matter, if the Court

22

ruled in your favor, what would be the remedies of all of the

23

parties?

24
25

MR. PIPELLA:

Your. Honor, the remedy that would

exist in this case for the Clements would be the same remedy

18

that would exist for the Clements if the Barkers had taken
back a note and a mortgage.

I recognize the fact that the

Clements weren't aware of this contract sale at the time they
had docketed their judgment.

I haven't taken their deposition

on the matter, because I didn't figure that was ever really
that important in order to argue this particular motion.
But their remedy, the cases also that we have cited,
in particular the Dahl vs. Prince case that's mentioned in our
memorandum, is that a judgment creditor isn't a bona fide
purchaser, and that a judgment creditor takes the debtor's
interest as he has it in the property.

He doesn't have any

better position, doesn't have any worse position, because he
obtains his judgment.
The remedy that I see on behalf of the Clements is
that they —

again, it is cited in our memorandum, proposed in

our memorandum —

is that they just execute on the note, which

they have every right to do.

They can take a supplementary

hearing, through supplementary proceedings, find out what the
assets are, and they can execute on the contract, and take the
Barkers' position.

And once they are in that position, then

they can demand payment from Dianne Hodge.
One of the cases that was cited by the defendant is
an Oregon case by the name of May vs. Emerson.
particular case —

In that

it is again mentioned in both memoranda

—

and it has been utilized by the defendants to support their

19

1

position that the judgment debtor —

judgment creditor has a

2

lien on the real property —

3

says, yes, he does have a lien, but in order to get the

4

contract buyer to make the payments to the judgment creditor,

5

the judgment creditor has to put himself in a position of a

6

contract seller.

7

himself into the position of the seller.

8

payments from the buyer.

9

contract prior to the time that the judgment creditor places

but the remainder of the case

He has to execute on the contract, and put
Then he can demand

If the buyer happens to pay off the

10

himself in a position of the seller, so be it.

11

buyer's responsibility to collect money for the judgment

12

creditor.

13

THE COURT:

14

MR. PIPELLA:

15

It is not the

Anything further?
I think we have talked about

everything I had in mind, your Honor.

16

THE COURT:

17

MR. LYBBERT:

18

THE COURT:

Response?
Just briefly, your Honor.
Answer the Court's question posed to

19

Counsel.

20

practical matter how is the case going to unravel?

21

If the Court rules in favor of the Cannefaxes, as a

MR. LYBBERT:

There is no more remedy.

As of the

22

day after that closing, back in September of 1985, when the

23

money was disbursed, unless their judgment lien had some

24

value, they really had no further remedy, the Barkers -- this

25

is not in the stipulated facts, either, but they are now with

20

1

bankruptcy, no way to go back against them, look to them for

2

further relief.

3

suggested that we go after the Hodges.

I didnft quite follow how Mr. Pipella

4

THE COURT:

Nor did the Court.

5

MR. LYBBERT:

They sold their interest.

6

her interest, I should say.

7

for the Clements.

8
9

THE COURT:

She sold

I think there is no more remedy

Counsel, you are just ready to say

something.

10

MR. PIPELLA:

I am.

11

MR. LYBBERT:

I would be glad to let him interrupt.

12

THE COURT:

Go ahead.

I am sorry.

We have allowed an hour for

13

the hearing.. The Court anticipates that the ruling today is

14

going to be dispositive of all of the issues.

15

it to your satisfaction as far as argument goes•

16

MR. PIPELLA:

Let's resolve

I think what prompted me to want to

17

say something was the remedy against Hodge.

18

that there is a remedy against the Hodges.

19

for the Clements was always against the Barkers, except they

20

had received payment from Dianne Hodge prior to executing on

21

the contract and placing themselves in the Barkers' position.

22
23

THE COURT:

I don't think
I think the remedy

They become a conduit, a legal conduit

for the Clements to go against the Hodges, and if that legal

24 J conduit is now insulated by a bankruptcy, then they have no
25

remedy against Hodge.

21

MR. PIPELLA:

Hodge paid all of the money.

in full, in August of 1985.

She paid

And the Barkers got the money.

The issue is now the defendants are seeking to enforce their
lien against the real property.
THE COURT:

The Court understands that.

If the

Court rules in favor of the Cannefaxes today, then what do the
Clements do to obtain satisfaction on the $54,000 judgment?
And talk about that for a moment as you argue to the Court the
purpose of recording statutes.

What is the underlying purpose

of the recording statutes in this state?
MR. PIPELLA:

The statute 78-22-1 specifies at the

time the judgment is docketed that the judgment is on all of
the real property owned by the debtor.
someone —

when you have —

And if —

and when

I am going to argue in the

hypothetical here, because I don't think the Barkers had a
real property interest at the time the judgment was
docketed —

when that judgment is docketed, it becomes a lien

on all the real property.

When somebody else buys the

property from the judgment creditor, or makes a loan to the
judgment creditor, it is put on notice
THE COURT:
MR. PIPELLA:

—

It is subject to a lien.
But my position is that Dianne Hodge

bought the property from the Barkers four years prior, and
became the owner at the time that she bought the property, and
the only reason we are having this discussion is over the

22

1

financing method that was chosen by the parties at closing.

2

If there had been an all-Inclusive note and deed of trust

3

utilized or if the Barkers had taken a third note, a note

4

secured by a third deed of trust, we wouldn't be having this

5

argument, this discussion, and my position is that the

6

contract is just like a note and a mortgage.

7

instrument.

8

affect Dianne Hodge's interest in the real property.

9

The fact that the judgment was docketed doesn't

THE COURT:

10

MR, LYBBERT:

11

THE COURT:

12

It is a security

Counsel?
Is there a question pending?
Do you have anything else you would like

to say?

13

MR. LYBBERT:

Yes.

The fact is that they didn't /)«:]

14

sell this property by contract."

15

legal title.

16

spoken to the matter, Butler vs. Wilkinson case, where they

17

clearly recognized the existence and the validity of a

18

judgment lien against the vendor's remaining interest.

19

say —

let me quote this again, since we do have a little

20

time.

"Nor for that matter is a judgment lien against the

21

vendor's interest extinguished by the vendor's sale of that

22

interest."

23

real property, not personal property.

24

Butler opinion refers to a judgment lien against the vendor's

25

interest, it necessarily refers to an interest in real

By doing so, they retained

I really, truly believe the supreme court has

They

By definition, a judgment lien only attaches to
Therefore, when the

23

property.
Therefore, the supreme court is saying that the
vendor in fact does retain an ownership interest in real
property, and not just a security interest, at least as
between —

when you bring this third party, this judgment

creditor into the situation, as between a two-party situation
where the only two interests you are talking about is that of
the vendor and the vendee, then application of this doctrine
of equitable conversion may and frequently is found to be
perfectly appropriate.

But when you are talking about the

interest of a third person, then you are not going to
automatically apply that doctrine of equitable conversion.

In

this case you certainly don't.
We are not asking, we are not suggesting that we are
entitled to foreclose up to the full amount of the value of
the property or even up to the judgment amount.

What we think

we are entitled to is that amount that was due, not even on
the date that the judgment was docketed, but on the date a
month later when the double closing occurred and Barkers gave
title, gave a deed to Clement, and Clement gave a deed to the
Cannefaxes.

That's the date we are looking to, to determine

what interest Barkers still had that was subject to this
judgment lien.

That amount is the $54,000 we talked about in

the memorandum.
Mr. Pipella has cited some cases where the Utah

24

court has applied the doctrine of equity conversion-

In each

of those cases it is a case of looking between the vendor and
the vendee how you are going to characterize the vendor's
interest.

Those cases, which have considered the issue we are

talking about today, whether the judgment lien attaches to the
vendor's interest, have acknowledged the existence of the
doctrine of equity conversion and said we are not going to
apply it in this case.

It is an equitable doctrine, not to be

applied in every instance, and almost without exception.
There are cases that have just flat out, without much
analysis, said the judgment lien doesn't attach to a vendor's
remaining interest.

The majority rule, as I have stated, I

have quoted in my memorandum from Am Jur, is —
THE COURT:

Is this in your reply?

MR. LYBBERT:
THE COURT:

46 Am Jur 2nd.

Which page?

MR. LYBBERT:
THE COURT:

It is in my initial memorandum.

What page?

MR. LYBBERT:
THE COURT:

No.

Page 5 of my original memorandum.

All right.

MR. LYBBERT:

Have you read that?

THE COURT: Yes.
MR. LYBBERT:
THE COURT:
peace.

I will submit it, your Honor.

Submit?

Or else forever hold your

You have whatever opportunity you would like to

25

1

respond.

2

customary rules on arguing motions for summary judgment,

3

because the Court's ruling this morning is going to be

4

determinative of the case, and you should have every

5

opportunity, both of you, to argue whatever you would like,

6

irrespective of the standard format in these matters.

7

your client's remedy, as a practical matter, if the Court

8

rules against him?

9
10
11

The Court has relaxed considerably this morning its

MR. PIPELLA:

What is

Your Honor, the client's remedy is

probably a claim against the title insurance,
THE COURT:

And the Court keeps coming back to that

12

position in its attempt to rule properly on this case.

13

is the underlying purpose of a recording statute?

14

in fact does not put the owner —

15

buyer's agent on notice that there is a cloud on title and a

16

contingency ought to be made to remove that cloud, then the

17

recording statutes really have no effect.

18

MR. PIPELLA:

What

And if that

or the buyer, rather, or the

Your Honor, and I agree.

But all of

19

my comments have been made that the Barkers simply did not

20

have an interest to which the lien attached at the time the

21

judgment was docketed.

22

They were mortgagees.

23

THE COURT:

It was a personal property interest.

Would your argument be any stronger if

24

the dispute were between the original buyer and the original

25

seller as opposed to a third party now, as Counsel has

26

alluded?
MR. PIPELLA:

Your Honor, if — t h e application of

equitable conversion between the seller and the buyer has
always applied to a third party.

In the cases that have been

cited, in Butler, we are looking at a third-party judgment
creditor.

In the Kartchner case, we use the State Tax

Commission as an adverse party, depending on whether or not
the seller's interest was held to be personal or real
property.

It always applied to a third party, as between the

seller and the buyer. If no third party ever makes a claim or
there is no possibility that a third party would make a claim,
then there is no need to argue that equitable conversion has
taken place.

The argument is there to protect the buyer

against potential claims made against his seller, in order to
protect him, to give him, the buyer, the benefit of the
bargain, the benefit of his bargain.
MR. LYBBERT:
THE COURT:
MR. LYBBERT:

One last word, your Honor?

You may.
In the Butler vs. Wilkinson case, they

considered the doctrine of equitable conversion and found it
applicable in order to find that a judgment lien could attach
to the vendee's interest.

That certainly doesn't mean that

—

it just doesn't mean there is only one of those two interests
that a judgment lien can attach to.

In this case it is easy

to separate and determine, and we stipulated what the vendor's

27

1

interest was, financially speaking, and what the vendee's

2

interest was.

3

still owed him at the time of this closing in September of

4

1985.

5

is equitable doctrine.

6
7

J 9^
notVapplied. If there are no strong equities, it is not
applied. In this case there is no strong equity.

8
9

The vendor's interest was that $54,000 that was

The doctrine of equitable conversion Is just that.

THE COURT:

It

If it is equitable to apply it, it is

The Court will take a ten-minute recess.

The Court has read all the pleadings in support of and in

10

opposition to the motion.

We will take a ten-minute recess

11

and return and make a ruling.

12

(Court was in recess.)

13

THE COURT:

The record will reflect the court is

14

back in session.

Having read the memos in support of and in

15

opposition to the defendants' motion for summary judgment

16

is that the only issue before the Court?

17

MR. PIPELLA:

18

THE COURT:

—

Yes, your Honor.
The Court looks carefully at a number of

19

facts and legal and equitable principles in this case, and

20

observes as follows:

21

conversion apply?

22

ruling?

23

deed to Dianne Hodge, after the Clements 1 judgment against the

24

Barkers had been docketed, that Dianne Hodge had construtive

25

notice of the existence of the judgment lien, and so did the

Should the doctrine of equitable

If so, what facts are persuasive in so

The Court notes that when the Barkers gave a warranty
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plaintiffs.

Prior to recording of the deeds from Barkers to

Hodge, and from Hodge to Cannefax, Security Title Agency did a
title search, and discovered the recorded judgment by
Clements,

As of that date, the Cannefaxes, through their

agent, not only had constructive notice but they had actual
notice that the judgment existed against the property.
The Court suggests that a reasonable course of
action would have been for the Cannefaxes to have insisted
that the judgment lien be cleared at the time they purchased
the property.

Then Security Title could have either excepted

that judgment lien from its coverage or made other
arrangements to remove the cloud on title.

Instead, they

ignored the judgment, they bound the title insurance on the
property, and they recorded the deeds.
Now, the question is, if the Court is to be
persuaded to rule under equitable doctrines, what is or what
isn't equitable?

Who was in the better position to anticipate

the ultimate implications of that cloud on title, and to deal
with it at the time of purchase of the property by the
plaintiffs in this case?

The Court feels and is persuaded by

the Butler vs. Wilkinson case that states, in part, "A vendee
who voluntarily assigns or sells his equitable interest to a
third person does not by that assignment or sale extinguish a
creditor's judgment lien that attached during the vendee's
ownership of the equitable interest in the property, nor is a

29

judgment lien against the vendor's interest extinguished by
the vendor's sale of that interest to a third person."
The Court rules that the contract vendor in fact
does retain an interest in real property, and so rules that
that was the case in the case before the Court.

Based on the

facts stipulated, argument of counsel, the law cited, it is
the ruling of the Court that, according to the terms and
conditions and amounts heretofore stipulated by the defendant,
that summary judgment is granted to the defendant.
Counsel, the Court appreciates a scholarly and
exhaustive approach to the briefing of these issues.

It is

the type of case where, because of the complexity of the
issues, because of the implications of the ruling, the Court
appreciates the professional and thorough approach to this
matter by both counsel.

The defendant is ordered to prepare a

written order consistent with the Court's ruling, submit it to
the Court for signature and filing with the Clerk of the Court
on or before the 5th day of March, 1988, 12 noon.

Court is in

recess.
(This proceeding was concluded.)
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C E R T I F I C A T E

I, BRAD J. YOUNG, hereby certify that on the 29th day of
February, 1988, I attended and reported, as official court
reporter, the proceedings in the above-entitled and numbered
matter before the Honorable Pat B. Brian and that the
foregoing is a true and correct transcription of my
stenographic notes thereof.
Dated at Salt Lake City, Utah, this 5th day of
April, 1988.
Off icial tQo\itt

Reporter
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IN THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT OF SALT LAKE COUNTY
STATE OF UTAH
RAYMOND P.L. CANNEFAX and DEBRA '
CANNEFAX,
]
Plaintiffs,
vs.
DONALD W. CLEMENT and RUTH L.
CLEMENT,
Defendants.

]
)
]

ORDER AND SUMMARY
JUDGMENT

)1

Civil No. C87-6232

])

Judge Pat B. Brian

Defendants1 Motion for Summary Judgment, praying for
judgment in their favor and against plaintiffs on the Complaint
on file herein and for judgment in their favor and against
plaintiffs on the Counterclaim on file herein, came on regularly
for hearing on February 29, 1988 before The Honorable Pat B.
Brian, District Judge.
Rodney M. Pipella.
H. Lybbert.

Plaintiffs appeared by their attorney,

Defendants appeared by their attorney, Steven

The court has considered the Stipulated Facts,

defendants1 Memorandum of Points and Authorities in Support of
Motion for Summary Judgment, plaintiffs1 Memorandum of Points and
Authorities in Opposition to Defendants1 Motion for Summary
Judgment, and defendants1 Reply to Plaintiffs1 Memorandum in
Opposition to Defendants1 Motion for Summary Judgment, all of
which are on file herein, and court has heard the oral arguments

O00184

of counsel.

Having considered the above pleadings and oral

argument, and good cause appearing,
IT IS HEREBY ORDERED that defendants1 Motion for
Summary Judgment is granted; and
IT IS HEREBY ORDERED, ADJUDGED AND DECREED that
judgment be, and hereby is, entered in favor of defendants and
against plaintiffs on the Complaint on file herein, and the
Complaint is hereby dismissed; and
IT IS HEREBY ORDERED, ADJUDGED AND DECREED that:
1.

As a matter of law, a contract vendor of real

property does retain an interest in the real property which is
subject to the lien of a judgment against him,
2.

When defendants1 Judgment against George W. Barker,

Jr. and Lila Mr. Barker was docketed with the Clerk of the Third
Judicial District Court of Salt Lake County on August 19, 1985,
that Judgment created a valid lien against the property at 2563
East Lockhart Road in Salt Lake County, Utah, which property is
more particularly described in paragraph 5 of the Verified
Complaint herein.
3.

In this case, in light of Stipulated Fact No. 14,

it is equitable that the judgment lien created when said Judgment
was docketed in Salt Lake County bound the property to the extent
of the amount unpaid on the Uniform Real Estate Contract between
the Barkers, as sellers, and Diane Hodge, as buyer, on September
25, 1985, (the date Diane Hodge received a warranty deed from the
Barkers and gave a warranty deed to plaintiffs), less the amount
of the prior encumbrances on the property in favor of Prudential
2
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Federal Savings & Loan Association and Continental Bank and Trust
Company; to wit/ the judgment lien bound the Lockhart Road
property in the sum of $54/464.94,
IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that the temporary injunction in
effect in this case should be,
Dated this

1/

and hereby is; dissolved.

day of March/ 1988.
BY THE COJIR-T:

The Hon. Pat B.
District Judge
H. D^'AON

Approved as to form:

.^rifn

-y

Rfedn^y M. P i p e l l a
Attorney for P l a i n t i f f s

MloAj^XJ^^
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CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE
The undersigned certifies that on July D

/ 1988, I

hand delivered four copies of the foregoing Respondents1 Brief to
Rodney M. Pipella, attorney for appellants, at 648 East First
South, Salt Lake City, Utah.

/

%UM l^MfttU-

Steven H. Lybbe£t

